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STANDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES: MATCHING INJURIES
WITH INSTITUTIONS
Branden Lewiston*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is summer 2019, and President Trump’s plan to build a wall
on the southern border fails to overcome a filibuster in the Senate;
nonetheless, he remains committed to building the wall. Finding that
Mexico refuses to foot the bill in Congress’s stead, Trump redirects a small
portion of funds from other budgets into a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) account designated for financing the wall. DHS then hires
contractors and begins construction. Congressional leaders are outraged—
President Trump has usurped their power of the purse. In a rare moment of
bipartisanship, Congress passes legislation over a presidential veto directing
DHS to return the funds to the proper budgets and to cease payments to
contractors. Trump ignores the directive. DHS continues building the wall.
Does Congress have standing to sue the President?
Although fanciful, this scenario parallels a recent suit by the House of
Representatives against the Obama administration.1 In House v. Burwell, the
House sued the Department of Health and Human Services for allegedly
spending billions of unappropriated dollars, plus failing to implement the socalled employer mandate in the Affordable Care Act.2 Congress itself did
not file suit—Democrats in the Senate would have made that impossible—
but the House sued as an institutional plaintiff after passing an authorizing
resolution.3 The Obama administration responded that the House did not
have standing.4 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
split the baby, holding that the House had standing for the appropriation
claim but not the enforcement claim.5 The court then ruled for the House on
the merits but stayed the injunction pending appeal.6
*

Branden Lewiston, A.B. Princeton University 2014, J.D. Georgetown Law 2017, is an
attorney practicing in Washington, D.C.
1. See United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C.
2015).
2. Id. at 57.
3. Id. at 63.
4. Id. at 67, 70.
5. Id. at 75–76.
6. United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 189
(D.D.C. 2016).
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The standing claim in House v. Burwell was “novel and largely
unprecedented.”7 However, in an era of divided government and gridlock,
executive action becomes increasingly appealing.8 The prospect of an
unfulfilled agenda tempts presidents to act unilaterally. The Obama
administration even trumpeted its executive actions in response to
congressional gridlock with the slogan “We Can’t Wait.”9 President Trump
has promised to follow suit with wide-ranging executive actions of his
own.10 When presidents unilaterally implement controversial aspects of their
agenda, members of Congress in the opposition will use all the tools at their
disposal to thwart that action.11 If the ruling in House v. Burwell stands, the
congressional suit will be one of Congress’s tools.12
Although the standing decision in House v. Burwell is novel, the
Supreme Court has addressed some related standing questions. As will be
discussed in more detail below, the Court granted standing to individual
legislators in Coleman v. Miller13 and Powell v. McCormack,14 but it denied
standing to members of Congress in Raines v. Byrd.15 The Court has granted

7. Jonathan Adler, House Obamacare Lawsuit Clears First Major Hurdle (In Part),
WASH. POST
(Sept.
10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/09/10/house-obamacare-suit-clears-first-major-hurdle-inpart/?utm_term=.9b4b70cfbef0. See also Lyle Denniston, Judge: Billions Spent Illegally on
ACA Benefits, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (May 12, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016
/05/judge-billions-spent-illegally-on-aca-benefits/ (“It is highly unusual for courts to allow
one house of Congress, or individual lawmakers, to sue in federal court.”).
8. See Jaime Fuller, Executive Actions: An Increasingly Common Way for Congress to
Hate Presidents, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2014/11/17/executive-actions-an-increasingly-common-way-for-congress-to-hatepresidents/?utm_term=.317a9d3dddd2; Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets
Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us
/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-bypass-congress.html.
9. Dan Pfeiffer, We Can’t Wait, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 24, 2011), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/24/we-cant-wait.
10. See, e.g., Paige W. Cunningham, Tom Price: Legislation Only Part of Repealing
Obamacare, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tomprice-legislation-only-part-of-replacing-obamacare/article/2617524; Yousef Saba, Trump
Announces Executive Actions for Day One, POLITICO (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.
politico.com/story/2016/11/donald-trump-executive-actions-231726.
11. See Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The
Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 281
(2001) (predicting continued suits from legislators).
12. A party has standing when they suffer a concrete, particularized injury that is
traceable to the defendant’s actions and redressable by the court. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
13. 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939).
14. 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
15. 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).
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standing to the Arizona state legislature,16 and it has permitted congressional
chambers to defend federal laws as intervenors or amici.17 In United States
v. Windsor, Justices Alito and Scalia debated each other on whether the
House had standing in their respective dissents.18 The slate of congressional
standing doctrine is neither full nor blank. Throughout its decisions, the
Court has yet to articulate a complete and coherent theory of congressional
standing. Instead, as often occurs, the Court has provided only narrow
decisions, each relevant to a theory of congressional standing, but none
sufficient on its own to provide such a theory.19
This Article contributes to the discussion of congressional standing by
arguing that standing differs for various congressional parties.
Congressional standing is appropriate when the congressional party’s power
or right matches the alleged injury. For instance, the House did not have
standing to sue in House v. Burwell,20 but Congress would have. Defenders
and critics of congressional standing alike have failed to meaningfully
distinguish between Congress as an institutional plaintiff and a chamber of
Congress as a plaintiff.21 This includes the district court in House v.
Burwell,22 academic commentators,23 and Supreme Court justices.24 Unlike
other defenses of congressional standing, this Article sharply distinguishes
between standing for Congress, chambers of Congress, and members of
Congress. Each type of congressional party only has standing when powers
specifically held by that congressional party are infringed. Congressional
standing is proper if, and only if, the alleged infringement matches the
plaintiff’s right.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a background on
congressional standing, both in Supreme Court precedent and in scholarly
literature;25 Part III argues in favor of standing for congressional parties
16. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677
(2015).
17. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 927 (1983); United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744, 755 (2013).
18. 570 U.S. at 778–818.
19. See cases cited supra notes 1318.
20. United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 75–76
(D.D.C. 2015).
21. See infra notes 2224.
22. Id. at 71 (arguing that “the House has suffered a concrete, particularized injury that
gives it standing to sue” because “Congress (of which the House and Senate are equal) is the
only body” that has spending power).
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 804–05 (Alito, J. dissenting) (asserting that the “House of
Representatives . . . suffered . . . an injury” when “Congress’ legislative power” was
impaired).
25. See infra Part II.
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when the alleged injury matches the party’s constitutional powers;26 Part IV
discusses separation-of-powers concerns inherent in permitting standing for
congressional parties;27 Part V explores whether standing for congressional
parties should extend to claims of executive non-enforcement rather than
only direct executive infringements on congressional power;28 and then, the
article briefly concludes.29
II. BACKGROUND
Standing doctrine has historically had precious little to say about
congressional parties. The Supreme Court has never directly confronted the
question of whether Congress or a chamber of Congress has standing to
challenge executive action. But in the past few years, a handful of academic
commentators have begun to take congressional standing doctrine more
seriously.30 The overall thrust of both precedent and scholarship is that
Congress and its chambers do not have standing to sue the executive and
that members of Congress have standing only to guard against vote
nullification or its equivalent.31
A.

Supreme Court Precedent

Congressional standing doctrine traces to Coleman v. Miller.32 In
Coleman, the Court granted standing to a group of state legislators in Kansas
challenging their executive branch.33 The state senate had deadlocked on a
vote for a constitutional amendment, and the lieutenant governor of Kansas
provided the decisive vote to approve of adopting the amendment.34 The
dissenting state legislators sued, contesting the right of the lieutenant
governor to vote on constitutional amendments.35 The dissenting legislators
reasoned that their votes had been essentially nullified by the lieutenant
governor casting a decisive vote.36 The Court found that the plaintiffs had
“an interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes” sufficient to
grant standing.37 The Court emphasized that their votes “would have been
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B.
307 U.S. 433, 437 (1939).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id. at 436–38.
Id. at 438.
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decisive in defeating the ratifying resolution” if the lieutenant governor did
not cast a vote.38 The Court then ruled against them on the merits, holding
that it was for Congress to decide whether Kansas ratified the constitutional
amendment.39
In Bond v. Floyd and Powell v. McCormack, the Court permitted a state
legislator and a member of Congress, respectively, to challenge their
chamber’s attempt to refuse to seat them after being duly elected.40 In Bond,
the Georgia House of Representatives refused to seat an elected
representative because of his anti-war viewpoints.41 The Court did not
specifically address standing, but it nonetheless heard the representative’s
case and ruled in his favor.42 In Powell, a member of Congress was excluded
by the House because of personal scandals.43 Again, the Court did not
directly address standing, but it explicitly found an Article III case or
controversy.44 In both cases, the legislator had standing to challenge his
exclusion from his respective institution.45
The Court had another occasion to address congressional standing in
Raines v. Byrd.46 Six members of Congress who voted against the Line Item
Veto Act subsequently sued and challenged its constitutionality, alleging
that the statute undermined the effect of the members’ votes.47 The statute
permitted the President to cancel certain tax or funding provisions in
legislation.48 The Court held that the individual members of Congress did
not have standing because they did not suffer a “concrete injury.”49 The
Court described their injury as an “abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power” insufficient to confer standing.50 That is, the members’
votes were given full effect, so they had not suffered an injury.51 The Court
explained that the institutional injury “necessarily damages all members of
Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.”52 The only injury was to
Congress’s institutional legislative powers, not to the members’ voting
38.
39.
40.
(1969).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Coleman, 307 U.S. at 441.
Id. at 446–50, 456.
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 188 (1966); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489
Bond, 385 U.S. at 118–28.
Id. at 136–37.
Powell, 395 U.S. at 489–90.
Id. at 495–96.
Powell, 395 U.S. 486; Bond, 385 U.S. 116.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813–14 (1997).
Id. at 814.
Id. at 814–15.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 826.
Id.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
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powers.53 The Court specifically noted that neither chamber had approved of
the members’ suit.54
The Court has also addressed whether congressional chambers can
defend a statute in the executive’s stead. Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha concerned an immigration statute that permitted a
chamber of Congress to veto the Service’s decision to suspend deportation
proceedings.55 The House vetoed the Service’s suspension of deportation
proceedings against Chadha.56 Chadha sued, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional, and the I.N.S. agreed.57 Before the Supreme Court, both the
House and the Senate separately intervened to defend the constitutionality of
the statute.58 The Court held that the case presented an Article III case or
controversy and that Congress was a “proper party” to defend the statute.59
The Court then ruled against the congressional parties on the merits.60
A similar issue came before the Court in Windsor.61 The Obama
administration declined to defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in
court.62 However, the administration continued to enforce DOMA, thus
granting private plaintiffs standing to challenge it.63 The House, through its
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), intervened to defend the law in
district court.64 The House lost in district court, and both BLAG and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed.65 The Solicitor General also filed a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.66 The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court, and the Supreme Court granted review on both the constitutionality of
DOMA and on two questions related to whether BLAG could defend the
law.67 The case then presented the Court with the question of whether
BLAG—and by extension, the House—had standing to defend a federal law
in the executive’s stead.68 However, the Court did not decide the issue,
instead holding that the federal government had standing, and because the
DOJ appealed and filed the cert. petition, it was unnecessary for the Court to
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 829.
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 924–26 (1997).
Id. at 926–28.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 928, 930 n.5.
Id. at 930–31.
Id. at 959.
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 744 (2013).
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 754–56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 754–56.
Id.
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determine whether the House also had standing.69 In their respective
dissents, Justices Scalia and Alito debated whether the House would have
standing, with Scalia answering “no” and Alito responding “yes.”70
Most recently, the Court addressed whether a state legislature can have
standing in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission.71 A constitutional amendment passed by ballot initiative took
redistricting power away from the Arizona legislature and gave it to the
Independent Redistricting Commission.72 The Elections Clause of the U.S.
Constitution arguably gave redistricting power to the Arizona legislature, so
the legislature sued.73 The Court held that the Arizona legislature plausibly
suffered an institutional injury—loss of its redistricting power.74 The Court
reasoned that this case was in line with Coleman because the Arizona
legislature’s vote over redistricting would now be completely nullified by
the redistricting commission.75 The Court therefore found that the legislature
had standing, although it then ruled against the legislature on the merits.76
B.

Scholarship on Congressional Standing

Little ink has been spilled by academic commentators on the question
of congressional standing, although in recent years, a handful of scholars
have begun to discuss the issue.77 The most recent round of scholarship
primarily focuses on re-litigating House v. Burwell, with some
commentators defending the Court’s decision78 and others arguing that it did
not go far enough in granting congressional standing.79 Only a few scholars

69. Id. The Court also held that BLAG’s participation satisfied prudential adversity
concerns, but the Court sharply distinguished between those concerns and Article III
standing.
70. Id. at 778–91, 803–04.
71. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2659.
74. Id. at 2663–65.
75. Id. at 2665.
76. Id. at 2671.
77. See infra notes 7881.
78. See Bradford C. Mank, Does A House of Congress Have Standing over
Appropriations?: The House of Representatives Challenges the Affordable Care Act, 19 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 188 (2016) (defending the district court’s decision in House v. Burwell
on both theories of standing).
79. See Bethany R. Pickett, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional
Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 459–60
(2016) (arguing that the House should have had standing to challenge the executive’s failure
to enforce the employer mandate).
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have acknowledged the potential difference in standing for Congress and a
chamber of Congress, and such acknowledgments have been in passing.80
Defenses of congressional standing have failed to delineate between
whether a chamber of Congress or only Congress itself could have standing.
In 1983, an early scholarly defender of congressional standing declared that
“either house of Congress would unquestionably have standing” to defend
statutes in court.81 The note argued that Congress suffers an injury when the
executive refuses to defend a duly-passed statute, but it failed to question
whether that injury confers standing to chambers of Congress or only
Congress itself.82 This oversight is not limited to defenders of congressional
standing: commentators skeptical of congressional standing have similarly
avoided this issue.83 More recent commentators offer more of the same.
Bethany Pickett, writing in 2016, defended congressional standing in cases
of executive non-enforcement, such as in House v. Burwell.84 However, her
argument does not distinguish between when Congress would have standing
and when a chamber would have standing.85 Other defenders of
congressional standing after House v. Burwell take the same approach.86
A few commentators have acknowledged the potential difference
between standing by Congress and standing by a chamber, but only in
passing. Tara Grove and Neal Devins, in their critique of congressional
standing, argue that the bicameralism requirement precludes unicameral
standing.87 They vividly argue that “neither house of Congress has standing
to defend their joint work product in court.”88 However, Grove and Devins
do not then conclude that Congress can defend its work product.89 What is
more, Grove and Devins do not situate their critique of unicameral standing
in standing jurisprudence—they focus on “normative political and historical
80. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Does United States v. Windsor (the Doma Case) Open
the Door to Congressional Standing Rights?, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 55 (2014) (asserting
without discussion that bicameralism does not bar one chamber of Congress from having
standing); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself
in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2014) (arguing that Congress never has standing,
and briefly mentioning that bicameralism precludes either chamber from defending their
“joint work product”).
81. Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970,
986–87 (1983) (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 11, at 221.
84. Pickett, supra note 79, at 458–61.
85. Id.
86. Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 339, 378–79 (2015); Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015).
87. See Grove & Devins, supra note 80, at 627.
88. See id.
89. Instead, they dismiss the possibility as unlikely. Id. at 614.
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analysis,” not particularized injuries.90 Also, they do not consider whether
bicameralism blocks unicameral standing when the work product is not
“joint,” but rather specific to that chamber, such as in the advice and consent
context with the Senate.91 Other commentators have followed suit, briefly
mentioning that bicameralism may affect unicameral standing without
delving into the implications, 92 or noting without elaboration that both
chambers may suffer an injury when Congress is injured.93
III. WHEN CONGRESS CAN SUE THE PRESIDENT
A congressional party should have standing when the alleged
infringement plausibly intrudes on a right held by the plaintiff. The
emphasis here is whether the right really belongs to the plaintiff, or whether
it properly belongs to a different congressional party. This article discusses
three types of congressional parties: Congress itself, chambers of Congress,
and members of Congress. This article describes when each type of
congressional party does and does not have standing. Then, this article
argues that resolving the question of congressional standing on a party-byparty basis strikes an appropriate separation-of-powers balance.
A.

Congress as a Plaintiff

Congress should have standing to sue the executive when powers
assigned to it by the Constitution are allegedly infringed. For instance, under
the facts of House v. Burwell,94 Congress would have standing to challenge
the Obama administration’s alleged appropriation of funds. The Constitution
gives Congress sole authority to appropriate federal funds.95 The Obama
administration allegedly usurped that power by appropriating funds for the
Affordable Care Act without congressional approval.96 If the executive
branch exercises a right constitutionally assigned to Congress, then
90. Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s (Less) Limited Power to Represent Itself in Court: A
Comment on Grove and Devins, 100 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 166, 167 (2014).
91. Id. at 173 (“Grove and Devins never analyze whether the Constitution’s
bicameralism requirement applies to congressional litigation.”).
92. See Mank, supra note 78, at 186–87. See also Douglas R. Prince, Should Congress
Defend Its Own Interests Before the Courts?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 715, 715 (1981) (arguing
against standing for members of Congress without distinguishing between standing for
Congress itself compared to a chamber).
93. Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can
Solve the Enforce-but-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 593–94 (2012).
94. House v. Burwell (Burwell 1), 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2015).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; House v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168–69 (D.D.C.
2016).
96. Burwell 1, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
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Congress has suffered a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to
establish standing.
Conventional standing doctrine states that a party has standing when
they suffer a concrete, particularized injury that is traceable to the
defendant’s actions and redressable by the court.97 The traceability and
redressability prongs do not pose a great challenge to congressional
standing—in many instances, it will be clear that the executive infringed on
Congress’s power and that the court could enjoin the executive from
continuing to do so. The question of whether Congress suffers a concrete,
particularized injury when its powers are infringed by the executive poses a
bigger obstacle.
Current standing doctrine justifies granting Congress standing when its
powers are infringed. First, Chadha supports the notion that congressional
parties suffer a concrete and particularized injury when their powers are
infringed.98 The Court permitted both the House and Senate to intervene to
defend statutorily granted legislative veto powers.99 Although the Court did
not directly discuss why the House and Senate had standing in Chadha, the
implication is that the chambers’ statutory right to veto deportation
suspensions was at risk, and the deprivation of that statutory right would
constitute a particularized and concrete injury.100 The potential injury in
Chadha was statutory, but the reasoning applies just as strongly if
Congress’s constitutional powers were threatened. There is nothing in the
nature of congressional power that prevents Congress from suffering a
concrete and particularized injury when it is infringed.
Congressional standing finds further support in Arizona State
Legislature.101 There, the Supreme Court held that the Arizona legislature
had standing to challenge a provision of the Arizona Constitution adopted
by ballot initiative, claiming that it violated powers assigned by the U.S.
Constitution to the Arizona legislature.102 The Court reasoned that the
Arizona legislature plausibly suffered an “institutional injury” by being
deprived of a constitutionally assigned right.103 Similarly, Congress suffers
an institutional injury when the executive infringes on its constitutionally
assigned powers. However, the Court in Arizona State Legislature
97. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
98. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939–40 (1983).
99. Id.
100. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 783 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Because Chadha concerned the validity of a mode of congressional action—the one-house
legislative veto—the House and Senate were threatened with destruction of what they
claimed to be one of their institutional powers.”).
101. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2652
(2015).
102. Id. at 2659.
103. Id. at 2664.
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specifically limited its holding to the state context: “[t]he case before us
does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has standing to
bring a suit against the President.”104 The Court provided two reasons,
discussed below, that this case does not decide the question of congressional
standing.105 Neither undermines the support that Arizona State Legislature
provides for this Article’s defense of congressional standing.
First, the Court noted that “[t]here is no federal analogue to Arizona’s
initiative power.”106 True, but so what? Even if there were a federal
referendum process, a law passed through that process could violate
Congress’s constitutionally assigned powers just the same as an executive
action. The initiative was just the mechanism by which the Arizona
legislature’s constitutionally assigned power was allegedly infringed. The
reasoning of Arizona State Legislature does not turn on whether the alleged
infringement of the legislature’s powers came via the ballot initiative or
executive action—the Court instead focused on the fact that the legislature’s
power would be “nullified.”107 If anything, an executive action infringing on
Congress’s constitutional sphere represents a stronger case for congressional
standing than a violation via referendum. It is more constitutionally
repugnant for an overreaching executive to usurp congressional power than
for the people do to so via a referendum. If the Arizona legislature’s
constitutional power was violated by the governor controlling redistricting,
it should have standing to challenge that action just the same. Similarly,
whether Congress has standing to challenge alleged violations of its power
by the executive should not turn on the lack of a federal initiative.
The Court’s second justification for limiting the holding to the state
context was that “a suit between Congress and the President would raise
separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”108 The Court here lays its finger
on the major concern with granting standing to congressional parties.
Tradition and prudence counsel against the judiciary engaging in turf
disputes between the political branches.109 If Arizona State Legislature does
not decide the issue of congressional standing, separation-of-powers
concerns would be why. Separation of powers as an element of
congressional standing will be discussed more fully in Part IV.110

104. Id. at 2665 n. 12.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665.
108. Id. at 2655 n. 12.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 779–81 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
110. See infra Part III.
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From Arizona Legislature, we know that legislatures can suffer
institutional injuries when their constitutional powers are infringed.111 And
from Chadha, we know that congressional chambers can have standing
when statutorily granted rights are infringed.112 Together, then, these cases
demonstrate that Congress suffers a concrete, particularized injury when its
powers are usurped by the executive branch, and in such a situation, it has
standing to defend itself.113
B.

Chambers as Plaintiffs

Similarly, a chamber of Congress has standing when powers assigned
to that chamber are allegedly infringed—but not when powers assigned to
Congress as a whole are infringed.114 For instance, the Constitution gives the
Senate “advice and consent” power over making treaties and appointing
certain federal officers.115 If the President were to appoint a cabinet secretary
without advice and consent of the Senate, the Senate would have standing to
challenge that action.116 The Senate suffers a particularized and concrete
injury to its powers when the President appoints a top officer without its
advice and consent. If the House agreed with the President’s decision, then
the Senate might not have a realistic political solution. Judicial involvement
might be the Senate’s best hope for redress. In such a situation, it is
altogether proper that the Senate have standing to challenge the President’s
action.
This is not the situation in House v. Burwell. The right allegedly
violated, appropriation powers, belongs to Congress, not the House.117 Thus,
111. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664.
112. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939–40 (1983).
113. Id.; see also Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664.
114. There are four explicit unicameral powers in the Constitution: The House has the
power to impeach, the Senate provides advice and consent for certain nominations, and the
Senate has the power to try impeachments and ratify treaties. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 955 (listing unicameral powers). A statute might give a chamber unicameral power as well,
as in Chadha. Id. at 925. The Origination Clause does not quite give a power to the House,
and the House would have to be complicit in violating the origination requirement, likely
preventing the House from suing over its violation. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Investigatory
functions also might count as a unicameral power. See generally Una Lee, Reinterpreting
Raines: Legislator Standing to Enforce Congressional Subpoenas, 98 GEO. L.J. 1165, 1168
(2010) (discussing Congressional party standing to enforce subpoenas).
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
116. Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Arizona State Legislature that the majority’s rule
would indeed have granted the Senate power to challenge the President’s recess appointment
in N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2595–98 (2014). Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S.
Ct. at 2695 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. The implementation/non-enforcement theory in House v. Burwell is dealt with
below. See infra Part V.
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Congress is the appropriate plaintiff. The court in House v. Burwell stated
that “[t]he Congress (of which the House and Senate are equal) is the only
body empowered by the Constitution to adopt laws directing monies to be
spent from the U.S. Treasury.”118 Yet, the court nonetheless concluded that
“the House has suffered a concrete, particularized injury that gives it
standing.”119 The court never explains this discrepancy, but it seems to
reason that the House’s constitutional role would be undermined if its parent
body, Congress, suffered an injury.120 The court states that the “role of the
House would be meaningless” if Congress lost its exclusive appropriation
power.121 That is, the court seems to acknowledge that Congress is the truly
injured party, and that the House is only injured by extension.122
Raines complicates this injury-by-extension defense of standing for the
House. The Supreme Court held in Raines that six members of Congress did
not have standing to claim that a statute violated Congress’s constitutional
powers.123 The Court described the alleged injury as an “abstract dilution of
institutional legislative power.”124 Congress suffered the injury, not the
members, and the Court refused to grant the members standing merely
because Congress suffered an injury.125 To be sure, the Court concluded by
“attach[ing] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been
authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this
action.”126 In House v. Burwell, the House itself is the plaintiff,127 but the
reasoning in Raines nonetheless cuts against the House having standing to
challenge a violation of the appropriation power.128
Just as individual members of Congress do not have standing to
challenge executive actions allegedly violating the powers of Congress as an
institution, individual chambers of Congress also lack standing in such
cases. In both Raines and House v. Burwell, the alleged injury occurred at a
higher institutional level than that of the respective plaintiffs.129 That is, in
both cases the parent institution of the respective plaintiffs suffered the real
injury, and the dilution analysis in Raines points against inferring an injury
by a constituent party.130 Raines explained that the alleged injury was to “all
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

House v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 71 (D.D.C. 2015) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997).
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id. at 829.
Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 53.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 816.
Id.; Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 826.
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[m]embers of Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.”131 The injury
was diluted among the constituent parts of Congress and, therefore, only
fully particularized for Congress itself.132 For individual members, the injury
is two institutional levels up—the individual member would only be injured
insofar as his or her chamber is injured, and that chamber is only injured
insofar as Congress itself is injured. For an individual chamber, the injury is
only one institutional level off, but the injury still does not match the
plaintiff.
That difference in the degree of dilution perhaps explains why the court
in House v. Burwell failed to delineate between an injury to Congress and an
injury to the House.133 The court in House v. Burwell attempted to
distinguish Raines, arguing that in Burwell there is no “dilution” of
legislative power, whereas in Raines the power was diluted among the
members of Congress.134 The court is certainly right that the legislative
power is not diluted 535 ways in House v. Burwell. Instead, the dilution is
two ways—between the House and the Senate. However, dilution remains;
it is just a matter of degree. The House itself does not suffer an undiluted,
particularized injury when the executive allegedly violates Congress’s
appropriations power—only Congress does. Therefore, only Congress
would have standing.
Justice Alito, dissenting in Windsor, argued that the House has standing
to defend a federal statute, although he does not explicitly distinguish
between when Congress would have standing compared to the House.135
Alito argued that the House was a “necessary party” to the passage of the
statute.136 Here, Alito read Coleman as saying that the state legislators had
standing because their votes “would have carried the day” absent outside
intervention.137 He then used this argument to distinguish Raines, concluding
that the members of Congress in Raines did not have standing because those
members were not “the pivotal figures” in the legislation at issue.138
Therefore, Alito’s argument for single-chamber standing turned on the fact
that the single chamber is a necessary actor in a statute’s passage. Because
that chamber is necessary for the statute’s passage, the chamber should have
standing to defend it—and, possibly, challenge the executive for failing to
properly implement it.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
Id.
The decision remains on appeal.
130 F. Supp. 3d at 71.
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 805 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Alito’s reading of Coleman and Raines is more plausible than
the district court’s in House v. Burwell, but it also has its problems.139 To
start, Alito never explicitly connected the “necessary” criterion to standing
jurisprudence.140 Normally, standing jurisprudence asks whether the party
has suffered a particularized, concrete injury.141 As Alito acknowledged,
Congress suffers such an injury when its legislative powers are infringed,142
but Alito never explained why the House also suffers a particularized injury
just because its action is necessary for Congress to legislate.143 Certainly, the
House would suffer an injury if Congress acted without its consent. That
would be the equivalent of vote nullification, but that is quite different from
Alito’s conclusion that the House suffers an injury when Congress’s powers
are infringed simply because the House’s consent is a necessary part of
congressional action.
Alito might connect his argument to the injury element of standing
jurisprudence by arguing that the injury to Congress is passed on to its
chambers. This is the same type of “abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power” that the Court found in Raines which does not grant
standing.144 Even if this constitutes a real injury suffered by the chamber, it
is not a “particularized” injury as required by standing jurisprudence. The
“particularized” element of the injury requirement means that the plaintiff is
injured in a “personal and individual way.”145 The House is not injured in an
“individual way” when Congress’s powers are infringed. Instead, it is only
affected by virtue of being a constituent chamber of Congress. The injury is
secondary; it is derivative, not concrete and particularized. If the chambers
only suffer an injury by extension, then Congress, rather than the chambers,
should be the appropriate plaintiff.
Alito’s argument also leads to absurdities. Imagine that the House sues
the executive for appropriating funds without authorization. Alito’s theory
would grant the House standing, because the House is necessary for the
passage of an appropriations bill. Now imagine that the Senate disagrees
with the House and files an amicus brief—or even intervenes—in favor of
the executive. The House and Senate, then, would be on opposite sides of a

139. Justice Scalia criticized Alito’s defense of single-chamber standing on separation-ofpowers grounds. That critique is valid, but it is addressed in the separation-of-powers section
of this article rather than here. See infra Part IV.
140. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 805.
141. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
142. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997); infra Part IV.
143. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 805.
144. Raines, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997).
145. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1.
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suit about the powers of Congress, even though such power could only be
exercised by both chambers acting together.146
Another absurdity: If a bill passes the House by one vote, then every
member who voted yes was a necessary party to its passage. By Alito’s
reasoning, that might mean every member now has standing to challenge the
executive if the law goes unenforced. However, if the bill passed by five
votes, then, echoing Raines, a single member would not have standing.147 A
coalition of five members, though, would be a necessary party, and as a
group, they would have standing. If being a “necessary party” to the
exercise of congressional power is sufficient to generate standing, then such
silly vote-counting exercises seem inevitable.
Alito also pointed to Chadha for support.148 He argued that Chadha
“suggested” that Congress suffered an institutional injury sufficient to grant
standing.149 That may be true, but Chadha does not imply that a chamber has
standing to protect powers assigned to Congress.150 Instead, in Chadha, the
powers in question were unicameral—each chamber could exercise a
legislative veto independently—and both chambers intervened to defend
their unicameral powers.151 Alito responded that this is a “distinction without
a difference.”152 This Article’s defense of congressional standing supplies
the difference: a congressional party only has standing when powers
assigned to that party are infringed. In Chadha, each chamber had a
statutory power that was threatened with “destruction.”153 The chambers
both intervened in their individual capacity, just as would be appropriate
under this Article’s theory of party-specific congressional standing.154
Fundamentally, Alito’s argument is inconsistent with this Article’s
conception of the constitutional role of the chambers vis-a-vis Congress.
Article I provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a
Congress . . . which shall consist of a Senate and House of

146. This scenario is not so far-fetched. Forty Senators filed an amicus brief opposing the
House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in Windsor. If Democrats had a sufficient majority,
it could have been the Senate itself filing that amicus rather than just a collection of Senators.
See Brief of 172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as
Amici Curiae in support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the
Merits, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307).
147. Raines, 521 U.S. 811.
148. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 804–05 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 804.
150. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
151. Id. at 933–34.
152. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 805 (Alito, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 783 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that in Chadha the unicameral
legislative veto was threatened).
154. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931 n. 5.
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Representatives.”155 Also, bicameralism precludes the House from
exercising independent legislative authority.156 Only Congress has
legislative power,157 and the powers of Congress differ fundamentally from
those of its constituent chambers or members.158 Congress is more than the
sum of its parts. Only Congress, therefore, suffers an injury when legislative
powers assigned to it are infringed. Chambers, on the other hand, have
standing not to defend Congress’s constitutional powers, but rather only to
defend powers specific to the chamber.
C.

Members as Plaintiffs

Compared to what the Supreme Court has said about standing for
Congress or its chambers, case law on standing for individual legislators is
rich. This Article’s defense of congressional standing comports with the
Court’s case law for standing for members of Congress. Members can have
standing, but only in narrow circumstances where their constitutionally
assigned powers are violated. The Constitution grants members the right to
be seated in and vote on matters before their respective chamber.159 Also,
members have a few discrete rights, such as guaranteed compensation.160
Only when one of these narrow rights are violated would a member have
standing to sue the executive.
The trio of Coleman v. Miller, Powell v. McCormack, and Raines v.
Byrd provides the contours of standing for members of Congress.161
Coleman found that state legislators have an “interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes” sufficient to provide standing.162 That is, the
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
156. See Grove & Devins, supra note 80, at 574 (“[D]efense of federal statutes by the
House or the Senate violates an additional constitutional norm: bicameralism. The
Constitution divides the legislature into two separate and distinct chambers . . . and thus
largely prohibits unilateral action by either chamber.”).
157. The Presentment Clause would not likely pose a barrier to a single chamber
authorizing a suit because authorizing a suit does not constitute legislative action subject to
presentment. See Beermann, supra note 90 at 173 (“Congressional litigation is not legislative
action because it does not have the purpose or effect of altering anyone’s legal rights either
inside or outside the legislative branch.”).
158. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892) (“The two houses of congress are
legislative bodies representing larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any one
individual, but in the aggregate of the Members who compose the body, and its action is not
the action of any separate Member or number of Members, but the action of the body as a
whole.”).
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1
160. Id. § 6, cl. 1.
161. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
162. 307 U.S. at 438.
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legislators in Coleman did not allege that the power of their vote was
undermined because the state senate’s power was infringed, but rather that
their individual votes were not given effect within the state senate because
of a decisive outside influence—the lieutenant governor.163 Similarly, in
Powell v. McCormack, the Court found an Article III case or controversy
when a member of Congress challenged the House’s attempt to exclude him
from taking his seat without formal expulsion.164 The right to take his seat
was personal to the member. To be sure, Powell involved a member
challenging action by his chamber rather than the executive.165 But if
anything, the member’s case for standing would be stronger if the President
rather than the House refused to let him take his seat in Congress.166
Irrespective, the member in Powell had a personal prerogative that he could
defend in federal court.167
Raines distinguishes both Coleman and Powell in holding that six
members of Congress could not challenge the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto Act as diluting their voting power by diminishing Congress’s role
in appropriations.168 Raines held that the alleged injury was “institutional,”
not “personal” to the members of Congress.169 The Court explained that this
was unlike Coleman, because in Raines the members’ votes “were given full
effect” and continue to be given full effect.170 In Coleman, there was “vote
nullification,” whereas in Raines there was only “abstract dilution of
institutional legislative power.”171 Raines distinguished Powell on the same
grounds: unlike in Powell where the member was “singled out,” the claim in
Raines is only an “institutional injury.”172
The unifying thread of these three cases is that members of Congress
have standing when their right to vote on matters before Congress is
allegedly infringed.173 That right might be infringed by the member’s
chamber refusing to seat them, as in Powell,174 or it might be infringed by
vote nullification via an outcome-determinative executive action, as in
163. Id. at 436–38.
164. 395 U.S. at 514.
165. Id.
166. In that situation, the House might also have standing to challenge the executive
because the Constitution provides it with exclusive control over its members, not the
executive. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
167. 395 U.S. 486.
168. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–26 (1997).
169. Id. at 821.
170. Id. at 824.
171. Id. at 826.
172. Id. at 821.
173. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Raines, 521 U.S. 811.
174. Powell, 395 U.S. at 514.
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Coleman.175 However, members do not have standing to challenge a mere
dilution of the potential influence of their vote when Congress’s powers are
restricted, as in Raines.176 The latter scenario implicates Congress’s rights,
not the rights of the members of Congress.
One can imagine a constitutional provision that would more clearly
generate cases where members would have standing.177 Imagine a
constitutional amendment that gave individual Senators veto power over
federal judicial appointments in their home state.178 If either home state
Senator vetoed a judicial nomination, the nomination would fail. Imagine
further that the President, appalled by a Senator’s intransigence, ignored that
Senator’s veto. The President’s nominee was confirmed by the Senate at
large, and the judge took their seat. In this scenario, the Senator who
exercised the veto power should have standing because of an institutional
injury to that Senator’s constitutional office. The Constitution assigned a
specific power to the Senator, and the executive allegedly violated that
power. The Senator would therefore have standing.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Any defense of congressional standing must confront significant
separation-of-powers concerns. Such concerns are the cornerstone of
standing jurisprudence.179 Separation-of-powers principles are particularly
salient when standing implicates a conflict between the branches.180 But just
as a defense of some form of congressional standing must grapple with
separation-of-powers principles, so does a blanket denial of congressional
standing. Judicial involvement in an interbranch dispute risks disrupting an
appropriate separation-of-powers balance, as does judicial abdication. A
defense of congressional standing that distinguishes between different
congressional parties strikes the appropriate balance between permitting
limited judicial involvement in interbranch disputes without unduly
embroiling the judiciary in matters best left to the political process.
175. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
176. Raines, 521 U.S. at 820–21.
177. I thank Paul Clement for posing this hypothetical.
178. A similar rule—the so-called “blue slip”—already exists in non-constitutional form.
See Mitchel A. Sollengerger, The History of the Blue Slip in the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 1917-Present, CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 22, 2003), http://congressionalresearch.
com/RL32013/document.php.
179. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
180. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 819–20 (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute that would force us to decide whether an
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was
unconstitutional.”).
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Prudence and tradition counsel against any far-reaching theory of
congressional standing. Consistent judicial involvement in interbranch
political disputes would “risk damaging public confidence that is vital to the
functioning of the Judicial Branch.”181 The specter of a Supreme Court
standing “at the apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional
questions” should caution against persistent judicial involvement in
interbranch political disputes.182 One can all too easily imagine that if the
decision in House v. Burwell were affirmed, suits against the executive by
chambers of Congress would become commonplace. In response to Justice
Alito’s defense of single-chamber standing in Windsor, Justice Scalia
argued that “the opportunities for dragging the courts” into political disputes
would be “endless.”183 The judiciary’s claim to be a non-political branch
would become even more tenuous than it already is. Instead, the judiciary
might find itself involved in numerous turf disputes between the political
branches.
A blanket denial of congressional standing raises grave separation-ofpowers concerns as well. The constitutional system of separation of powers
would be undermined if the President could usurp congressional power
while the judiciary watched from the sidelines. Indeed, that concern
prompted the Court in Windsor to permit the House to defend a federal
statute in the executive’s stead.184 This concern is further illustrated in
House v. Burwell, where “despite an intentional refusal by Congress to
appropriate funds for Section 1402, the Secretaries freely ignored Article I,
§ 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution and sought other sources of public money.”185
While the Court has not often granted standing to congressional parties, it
has struck down laws that accord too much or too little authority to one
branch of government,186 and it should do so even when the dispute is
directly between the political branches. If the executive ignores both the
Constitution and the will of Congress, the judiciary does not serve the
separation of powers by inaction. Instead, such inaction harms the
constitutional system of separation of powers.
It is possible to strike a balance between these two worries. Limiting
congressional standing based on the congressional party imposes sharp
181. Id. at 833.
182. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 774, 779 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 790.
184. Id. at 762 (“[I]t poses grave challenges to the separation of powers for the Executive
at a particular moment to be able to nullify Congress’ enactment solely on its own initiative
and without any determination from the Court.”).
185. 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 80 (D.D.C. 2015).
186. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“[W]e have not hesitated to
strike down provisions of law that . . . undermine the authority and independence of one or
another coordinate Branch.”).
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limits on suits from congressional parties, avoiding the worry of a judiciary
constantly embroiled in political turf disputes. The House would not be able
to sue the Obama administration under a non-appropriation theory, contra
House v. Burwell. Also, individual members could not sue the executive
when they believe Congress’s powers have been infringed either, in line
with the Court’s decision in Raines.187 However, congressional party suits
would be permitted in narrow circumstances when the alleged injury
matches the plaintiff’s right. Judicial involvement in interbranch disputes
remains proper when the judiciary serves as a “last resort.”188 This provides
an opening for the judiciary to defend the constitutional system of separation
of powers when, and only when, judicial involvement is necessary and
appropriate.
Two countervailing forces sharply limit the number of cases where
congressional parties would file suit and have standing to do so. On the one
hand, the Constitution assigns many more powers to Congress than to its
chambers, and more to chambers than to individual members.189 The higher
up you go, the more powers the congressional party has. Therefore, there are
more chances for the executive to violate that party’s powers. On the other
hand, the barriers to suits by Congress are more significant than barriers to a
suit by a chamber, which in turn are more significant than barriers to a suit
by members. Congress can only sue when both chambers approve, which
will be rare in an era of divided, partisan government. Additionally,
Congress always has the option to resolve political disputes through the
normal policy-making process rather than through time-consuming, risky
litigation.190 In most cases, a private plaintiff will have a much easier time
getting into court than Congress, so Congress will not even bother trying.
Chambers only need a majority of their own members to approve a suit,
which still poses a significant barrier. Meanwhile, members can file suits
independently with few barriers. Overall, the more power the relevant
congressional party has, the more challenging procedural obstacles to
defending that power in a lawsuit. These forces work against each other to
ensure that proper suits by congressional parties would be rare.
V. ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS
Even if we frame the discussion of congressional standing as party
specific, it still leaves open the question of what rights Congress would have
187. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997).
188. Id. at 833 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)).
189. See supra note 107.
190. See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 11, at 282 (congressional suits are rare because of
alternative legislative remedies).
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standing to defend. In House v. Burwell, the House sued the executive on
two separate theories: (1) the non-appropriation theory, that the executive
appropriated funds that it was not authorized to appropriate, violating
Congress’s appropriation powers;191 and (2) the employer-mandate theory,
that the executive failed to implement the employer mandate, violating
Congress’s general legislative powers.192 Congress should have standing to
challenge executive appropriations made contrary to law, as in House v.
Burwell.193 That is a clear usurpation of a power solely assigned to Congress
by the Constitution.194 However, it is not as clear if Congress suffers an
injury when the executive fails to faithfully implement a statute.195 The court
in House v. Burwell concluded that it did not.196 Additionally, Justice Scalia
also argued against standing for enforcement claims in his dissent in
Windsor.197 He critiqued Justice Alito’s defense of congressional standing
for allowing Congress to go to court “not only to vindicate its own
institutional powers to act, but to correct a perceived inadequacy in the
execution of its laws.”198 These types of enforcement-based standing claims
have received comparably significant discussion in academic literature.199
Congress should have standing claims against obvious executive nonenforcement. There are two constitutional hooks for Congress’s injury. First,
the Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted” to
Congress.200 The executive usurps that power by refusing to implement a
duly-passed congressional statute. Second, the President has an affirmative
duty to “take Care that the laws be faithfully executed.”201 The President
may have discretion in deciding how to execute a law, but he or she does not
have discretion over whether a law should be executed at all.202 Read
together, these provisions indicate that Congress has the power to pass
legislation with the expectation that its legislation will be faithfully
implemented. If the President violates that power, Congress suffers a

191. House v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 70 (D.D.C. 2015).
192. Id. at 75.
193. Id. at 81.
194. Id. at 76.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 788–89 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. See supra Part I.B.
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
201. Id. § 3.
202. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 1835, 1848–51 (2016) (describing cases where the Court has used the take care
clause to impose on the President a “duty to abide by and enforce the laws enacted by
Congress.”).
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particularized injury just the same as if the President usurped Congress’s
appropriations power.
The court in House v. Burwell disagreed.203 It described Congress’s
legislative authority as flowing from Article I’s “most general provision.”204
The court found that the “generalized nature” of the ineffective
implementation claim precludes it from involving a particularized and
concrete injury for standing claims.205 Another way to put it: even if
Congress has legislative powers, those powers do not extend to grant
Congress a legal interest in effective enforcement.206 Yet, if the President
refuses to implement a statute or twists a statute beyond the point of
recognition, that infringes Congress’s legislative powers just as much as
appropriating funds without congressional approval infringes Congress’s
appropriation powers. Justice Alito argued that “any impairment” of
Congress’s legislative power is a “grievous injury” to Congress’s “central
function.”207 There are also constitutional hooks for Congress’s injury in the
vesting clause and in the take care clause. Obstinate non-enforcement
functionally repeals congressional legislation.208 That injures Congress
sufficiently for Congress to have standing to defend itself.
Justice Scalia thought congressional standing entirely inappropriate on
separation of powers grounds.209 He was particularly worried about
enforcement claims, which would allow Congress to “pop immediately into
court” whenever the President “implements a law in a manner that is not to
Congress’s liking.”210 Indeed, Scalia seemed to concede the injury point, and
instead focused his critique on the prospect of too much political litigation
from Congress.211 However, a party-specific defense of congressional
standing keeps the floodgates closed. If only Congress, not its chambers, has
standing to challenge executive non-enforcement, the practical barriers to
filing a suit on behalf of Congress, as an institution, will prevent it from
routinely popping into court. Contrary to Scalia’s concern that Congress will
resolve implementation and enforcement disputes through litigation rather
than through policy-making,212 Congress will likely only resort to litigation
when it perceives the regular policy-making process to have failed to protect
203. 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 75 (D.D.C. 2015).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Grove & Devins, supra note 80, at 624.
207. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 805 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
208. See Pickett, supra note 79, at 468.
209. Windsor, 570 U.S.at 788–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id. The district court in House v. Burwell expressed this worry as well. 130 F. Supp.
3d 53, 75 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Windsor).
211. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 789 n. 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 791 (“Congress must care enough to act against the President itself, not merely
enough to instruct its lawyers to ask us to do so.” (emphasis in original)).
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its powers. Refusing to confirm executive nominees or blocking the
President’s agenda seems like a much quicker and expedient resolution to a
dispute with the executive than filing a suit and waiting for years of
litigation to come to an end—and agenda-blocking only requires one
chamber. Plus, in most cases, Congress can rest assured that private
plaintiffs with clear-cut standing will attack executive actions. Only in rare
cases will Congress itself be the sole plaintiff.
This Article’s defense of congressional standing describes which
congressional party should have standing to challenge executive actions. If
any congressional party were to have standing to challenge executive nonenforcement, it would certainly be Congress rather than its chambers or
members. This Article’s defense of standing for congressional parties is
nonetheless compatible with either granting or denying congressional
standing over enforcement claims. However, because Congress suffers a
similar injury in enforcement cases as it does in appropriation cases and
litigation would only occur in extraordinary circumstances, Congress should
have standing for enforcement claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congressional parties have standing to challenge executive action only
when the alleged infringement matches the plaintiff’s rights. Contrary to the
district court in House v. Burwell and Justice Alito’s dissent in Windsor,
individual chambers do not have standing when the powers of Congress are
infringed. However, they do have standing to defend against violations of
powers specifically assigned to an individual chamber by the Constitution.
Further, members of Congress can have standing too, but only when their
rights—such as the right to vote on matters before their chamber—are
infringed. Individual members do not have standing to defend the powers of
Congress as an institution.
This limited defense of congressional standing satisfies separation-ofpowers concerns brought up by both sides of the debate. Justice Scalia’s
concern that congressional standing will turn the judiciary into a roving
monitor, perpetually involved in political turf disputes, does not apply to this
Article’s limited defense of congressional standing that only permits suits
when the specific rights of the plaintiff are at issue. Further, the contrary
concern that judicial involvement is sometimes necessary to protect the
constitutional order is also resolved by this Article’s limited defense of
congressional standing. Congressional parties have standing to defend their
powers, but only their powers. The increasingly cumbersome barriers to
suits from congressional parties ensure that few disputes will get into court
and survive standing concerns. However, those that do will involve real,
concrete controversies, just as Article III requires.

